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INTRODUCTION
Two of the Supreme Court’s drier whistleblower cases
turned on how to define mundane words, but they are terrific
examples of similar judges interpreting text very differently.
Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean1 actually turned
on a question you would think the Court resolved a century or
two ago: how to define “law.” Federal employee whistleblowers
are unprotected if they disclosed something kept secret “by
law”; does forbidden by law mean only by statute, or also
forbidden by other “law” sources, like regulations? Kellogg
Brown & Root v. U.S., ex rel. Carter, 2 a False Claims Act 3 case
alleging military contractor corruption, turned on how to define
two similarly prosaic terms: (1) when a lawsuit is “pending” so
as to bar a similar later suit; and (2) whether “offenses”
triggering a relaxed limitations period include only criminal, or
also civil, violations.
Except
to
lawyers
practicing
federal
employee
whistleblower or False Claims Act litigation, the holdings were
the least interesting aspects of these cases. The Court ruled for
the plaintiff in both: in MacLean, holding that federal employee
whistleblowers do something forbidden “by law” if they violate
only a statute, not a regulation; and in Kellogg Brown & Root,
holding that civil (rather than criminal) violations are not
“offenses” triggering a relaxed limitations period, but also that
the only prior similar lawsuits sufficiently “pending” to
preclude a later suit are those still actively being litigated (not
already-terminated prior suits). But the cases are more broadly
informative to litigators with any types of cases, at any level,
because they show how even ideologically similar judges can
vary widely in their views of textualism, and thus can interpret
statutes in very different ways. Lawyers and analysts viewing
judges in purely ideological terms can miss such distinctions,
and thus can fail to notice important differences in how
different judges decide cases.
Part I below details how diametrically opposed views of
textualism
explain
the
infrequent
but
significant
disagreements between two otherwise very similar Justices:
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. Their
1.
2.
3.

135 S. Ct. 913 (2015).
135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015).
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
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opinions in MacLean and Kellogg Brown & Root, respectively,
so illustrate: whereas Justice Alito cited dictionary definitions
yet little caselaw in applying pure textualism to statutory
questions, Chief Justice Roberts applied purposivism, mixing
analysis of the text, of Congress’s subjective intentions, and of
his own view of whistleblower policy. Their opposing views of
textualism left them on the same sides in these cases, but
explain their divergence on the recent high-profile Obamacare
cases, King v. Burwell 4 and National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius. 5
Part II details how federal district judges display the same
variation as the Justices in their use of textualism. A review of
all decisions over twenty-five years by all thirteen judges in one
federal district (the District of Colorado) confirms that district
judges run the gamut: some decide cases by relying on
dictionary definitions every bit as frequently as Justices Alito,
Thomas, and Scalia; others rely on dictionaries much less often,
and some never do. The variation among the judges is
statistically significant, meaning that while random chance
could account for some fluctuation in judges’ rates of dictionary
citations, the most frequent and least frequent dictionary-citers
differ from the average by more than random fluctuation could
explain. Critically, while the three most textualist Justices are
also the most conservative, that pattern does not hold among
district judges.
Part II details not only the Colorado data, but an identical
examination of dictionary reliance by five of the most
conservative and five of the most liberal district judges in the
nation. Those ten judges’ dictionary reliance shows no
correlation to their ideologies; those citing dictionaries
significantly more than average include some of the most wellknown conservative judges and some of the most well-known
liberal judges. These findings confirm that while textualism
has earned a conservative reputation from the three most
conservative Justices being the most textualist, that pattern
may be happenstance, because it does not hold in the lower
courts. With some conservative judges relying infrequently on
dictionaries and some liberal judges relying frequently, a
litigator in a lower court errs if she decides whether to make

4.
5.

135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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textualist arguments based on the judge’s ideology—an
important litigation strategy recommendation based on the
findings of this Article that the Conclusion details.
I.

ROBERTS V. ALITO: STRIKING SIMILARITIES – EXCEPT AS TO
STATUTORY TEXTUALISM

In many ways, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Samuel Alito are as similar as judges can be: less than five
years apart in age, President George W. Bush appointed both
in 2005, and by one recent four-year tally, they vote together
an astounding 93% of the time—more often than commonly
matched pairs like Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas (86%); Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia
Sotomayor (90%); and narrowly edged out by only one other
pair, Justices Ginsburg and Elena Kagan (94%). 6 Especially
through Roberts’s and Alito’s first several years together on the
Court, analysts noted how their “similar voting records”
matched more tightly than those of other groups of Justices
appointed by the same President. 7
But despite the similarities between Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito, their opinions show very different statutory
interpretation methods. They deployed markedly different
statutory interpretation methodologies in Department of

6. Jeremy Bowers et al., Which Supreme Court Justices Vote Together Most
and Least Often, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2014, http://nyti.ms/To4ocP
[https://perma.cc/C3QT-7VBR] (analyzing cases from all 280 signed decisions in
argued cases during the four Supreme Court terms spanning fall 2010 to spring
2014).
7. See Christine Kexel Chabot & Benjamin Remy Chabot, Mavericks,
Moderates, or Drifters? Supreme Court Voting Alignments, 1838-2009, 76 MO.
L. REV. 999, 1001 (2011). Chabot & Chabot assert:
[T]he results of presidents’ Supreme Court appointments are mixed.
Consider the different experiences of George H.W. Bush and his son.
Both of George W. Bush’s appointees, John Roberts and Samuel Alito,
have similar voting records, which are thought to align with executive
preferences. The first Bush Administration did not fare as well. While
Justice Clarence Thomas votes with Republican appointees at a high
rate, David Souter voted with Democratic appointees at just as high a
rate.
Id. See also Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1045, 1091 (2009) (“The evidence on Justice Alito suggests he is similar in
minimalism to Chief Justice Roberts.”).
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Homeland Security v. MacLean 8 (a Roberts majority opinion)
and Kellogg Brown & Root v. U.S., ex rel Carter 9 (an Alito
majority opinion), as Section I.A details. Section I.B then
elaborates that this methodological difference helps explain the
few but high-profile differences between the votes Roberts and
Alito cast—most notably, their votes in the “Obamacare” cases,
King v. Burwell 10 and National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius. 11 Those methodological differences extend
beyond the Supreme Court; as Part II details, federal district
judges display the same ideology-defying divergence in
statutory interpretation methodology.
A.

Alito’s Textualism in Kellogg Brown & Root versus
Roberts’s Purposivism in MacLean

Justice Alito’s Kellogg Brown & Root opinion pounded
textualism, and little else. Dictionary definitions were the
authority for holding that a statute suspending limitations
periods for fraud “offenses” applied only to criminal, not civil,
violations. Specifically, when Congress enacted the statutory
language in the 1940s, then re-enacted it later, dictionaries
defined “offenses” as including only crimes, not civil
violations. 12 Hinting that the Supreme Court library’s
“dictionaries” section must be quite impressive, Justice Alito
cited three editions of Black’s Law Dictionary spanning 1933 to
2004, the 1948 edition of Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, two
editions of Webster’s New International Dictionary (from 1942
and 1976), and one of the American Heritage Dictionary (from
1992). 13 The number of dictionaries Justice Alito cited in that
section (seven) is more than double the number of cases he
cited (three). 14 Justice Alito went beyond dictionaries mainly to
note a textual difference between statutory provisions: an
earlier version of the statute defined the relevant offenses as
“indictable” wrongs, indicating that Congress meant to
reference “crimes”; and the statute resides in Title 18 of the
United States Code, which repeatedly defines only crimes as
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

135 S. Ct. 913 (2015).
135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015).
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
135 S. Ct. at 1976.
Id.
Id.
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“offenses.” 15 Justice Alito’s analysis of the other statutory term,
“pending,” had a similar ratio of dictionaries cited (two) to
cases cited (one)—only Marbury v. Madison, and not for any
point of law, but solely as an example of how a long-ago-ended
case is no longer “pending”:
[A]s petitioners see things, the first-filed action remains
“pending” even after it has been dismissed, and it forever
bars any subsequent related action. This interpretation does
not comport with any known usage of the term “pending.”
Under this interpretation, Marbury v. Madison is still
“pending.” So is the trial of Socrates. 16

There is nothing inherently wrong with Justice Alito’s
heavy reliance on dictionaries first, inter-statutory contrasts
second, and caselaw and policy considerations either tied for a
distant third or excluded entirely. His analysis is detailed,
careful, and persuasive, and this Article, in analyzing how and
when judges engage in textualism, does not engage in the
longstanding debate over the pros and cons of textualism. But
although Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Alito’s majority
opinion in Kellogg Brown & Root, Roberts’s own analyses of
statutes are very different, as MacLean shows.
Roberts is not overtly hostile to textualism; one of his
points in MacLean was a comparison of the texts of different
statutory provisions:
Throughout Section 2302, Congress repeatedly used the
phrase “law, rule, or regulation.” . . . In contrast, Congress
did not use the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” in the
statutory language at issue here; it used the word “law” . . . .
Congress generally acts intentionally when it uses
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
in another. 17

But to Roberts, textualism is just one among several
methods of analysis, no more privileged than policy
15. Id. at 1977.
16. Id. at 1979 (citation omitted) (holding that “an earlier suit bars a later
suit while the earlier suit remains undecided but ceases to bar that suit once it is
dismissed”).
17. Department of Homeland Security v. Maclean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015).
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considerations. His MacLean opinion expressly relied upon his
view of which interpretation most likely reflected Congress’s
subjective intent and his own view of the statutory purpose:
If “law” included agency rules and regulations, then an
agency could insulate itself . . . merely by promulgating a
regulation that “specifically prohibited” whistleblowing. But
Congress passed the whistleblower statute precisely
because it did not trust agencies to regulate whistleblowers
within their ranks. Thus, it is unlikely that Congress meant
to include rules and regulations within the word “law.” 18

It is hard to see Justices Alito, Scalia, or Thomas writing
anything like the above passage relying on what Congress
“[]likely . . . meant” and finding relevant that “Congress passed
the . . . statute because” of certain policy motivations about
“trust.” Instead, the Court’s textualists “refuse to consider the
debating history of statutes as relevant context.” 19 The
preceding quotation addressed Justices Scalia and Thomas in
1998, but the past decade shows that Justice Alito has joined
that Scalia/Thomas textualist camp, while Chief Justice
Roberts definitely has not.
Instead, Chief Justice Roberts fits within the category of
“pragmatists and purposivists, who are concerned with
enabling judges to adapt old statutes to new problems and who
believe [in] the process of legal reasoning from text, legislative
purpose, and precedent” alike. 20 In so defining that
methodology, statutory interpretation scholar William
Eskridge considers “Justice Breyer, a liberal[,] . . . the Court’s
best representative of a pragmatic or purposivist approach,”
along with Justice Ginsburg. 21 Of course, judges’ views of
textualism fall along a spectrum: on one occasion, Justice
Breyer opined against Roberts’s use of a dictionary to analyze a
statute; 22 on another, Justice Thomas detailed a “primary
18. Id. at 920.
19. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read the Federalist
but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (1998).
20. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts.
by Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 533 (2013).
21. Id. at 550–51.
22. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 612 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing Roberts majority opinion: “neither dictionary
definitions nor the use of the word ‘license’ in an unrelated statute can
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purpose” of the statute that “support[ed] the inclusive
interpretation” his opinion adopted. 23 But the existence of grey
area as to Justices’ use of textualism does not alter the overall
picture that Roberts is closer methodologically to Breyer/
Ginsburg “purposivism” than Scalia/Thomas “textualism,” as
Eskridge defines each: “methodology that focuses on statutory
text and considers committee reports generated by the
legislative process that produced the statute (Breyer and
Ginsburg’s purposivism) . . . [rather] than a methodology that
focuses on statutory text and considers ‘valid canons’ created
by judges (Scalia and Thomas’s new textualism).” 24
Does this Alito-Roberts distinction lack a difference, given
their strong pattern of voting together? To be sure, their
differing methodologies do not prevent them from voting
together, and they even joined each other’s opinions in
MacLean and Kellogg Brown & Root. But their methodologies
explain their differing views on the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), a.k.a. Obamacare. 25
B.

Alito’s Textualism versus Roberts’s Purposivism in the
Health Care Cases: NFIB v. Sebelius and King v.
Burwell

In adjudicating the PPACA, Chief Justice Roberts first
parted ways with Justice Alito and the other textualists when
he wrote the majority opinion upholding the PPACA against
constitutional challenge in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB). 26 NFIB drew the most attention
for its two-part constitutional ruling: first, that Congress’s
power “To regulate Commerce” 27 does not allow mandating a
demonstrate what scope Congress intended the word ‘licensing’ to have as it used
that word in this federal statute.”) (emphasis omitted).
23. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (majority opinion by
Thomas, J.) (holding that because a retaliation statute’s protection of “employees”
was “ambiguous as to whether it includes former employees,” the statute should
be deemed to include them for “consistency with a primary purpose of
antiretaliation provisions: . . . access to statutory remedial mechanisms. . . . [I]t
would be destructive of this purpose . . . for an employer to be able to retaliate
with impunity[,] . . . [which] support[s] the inclusive interpretation . . . .”).
24. Eskridge, Reading Law, supra note 20, at 551.
25. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
26. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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purchase (there, of health insurance); but, second, that
Congress’s power “To lay and collect Taxes” 28 allows imposing a
tax penalty for not making such a purchase. For illustrating
the Court’s varied views on textualism, however, Chief Justice
Roberts’s varied treatment of the word “tax” is more notable.
On the one hand, Chief Justice Roberts held that the tax
penalty for not purchasing insurance qualified as a “tax”
sufficiently to be an authorized exercise of the power: “That
constitutional question was not controlled by Congress’s choice
of label. We have . . . held that exactions not labeled taxes
nonetheless were authorized by Congress’s power to tax,”
Roberts explained, expressly declaring a “functional approach”
instead of the opposing purely textual approach that a payment
is a “tax” only if the statutory text says “tax.” 29 On the other
hand, he held that the same penalty was not a “tax” for
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act’s rule that “no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court,” 30 because “taxes can
ordinarily be challenged only after they are paid, by suing for a
refund.” 31 In response to the argument that if the penalty is
constitutionally authorized as a “tax,” then it must be a “tax”
protected from litigation by the Anti-Injunction Act, Chief
Justice Roberts began with a concession: “It is true that
Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a
penalty for constitutional purposes simply by describing it as
one or the other.” 32 But he elaborated that, for statutory
purposes, Congress may use words however it intends. “The
Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, however, are
creatures of Congress’s own creation. How they relate to each
other is up to Congress,” he held, yielding the conclusion that
“Congress’s decision to label this exaction a ‘penalty’ rather
than a ‘tax’ is significant.” 33 In short, the word “tax” has
different meanings under the constitutional tax power and
under the Anti-Injunction Act because, Chief Justice Roberts
explained, the purpose of the former is a broad grant of
legislative power while the latter is a narrow exception to

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
132 S. Ct. at 2594–95.
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
132 S. Ct. at 2582.
Id. at 2583.
Id.
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judicial power. Under this view, the same word with the same
dictionary definition can have different meanings, based on the
purpose of the clause containing the word.
In his view, Chief Justice Roberts did not reject textualism
entirely—he just respected Congress’s decision to use the term
“penalty” to distinguish the charge for purchasing insurance
from other “tax” statutes: “the best evidence of Congress’s
intent is the statutory text.” 34 Yet Roberts’s view of the “text”
as the “best evidence” was far from the Alito/Thomas/Scalia
brand of textualism. He defined the same word, “tax,”
differently based on statutory context and purposes—to the
dismay of Justice Scalia, whose dissent Justices Alito and
Thomas joined:
What the Government would have us believe . . . is that the
very same textual indications that show this is not a tax
under the Anti-Injunction Act show that it is a tax under
the Constitution. That carries verbal wizardry too far, deep
into the forbidden land of the sophists. 35

Even more presently relevant than NFIB was when Chief
Justice Roberts parted ways with Justice Alito as to the
PPACA in a second case, but this time as to statutory
interpretation, in King v. Burwell. 36 In King, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote the majority opinion saving the health law from
a drafting glitch that arguably disallowed federal subsidies in
various states. 37 The statute providing subsidies references
individuals in “an Exchange established by the State,” rather
than by the federal government, so Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito deemed it “quite absurd” for the federal government
to argue “that when the . . . Act says ‘Exchange established by
the State’ it means ‘Exchange established by the State or the
Federal Government.’” 38 Their logic was strong under their
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2656 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphases added).
36. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
37. Id. at 2487–88 (so holding, after framing the issue as follows: “The parties
dispute whether Section 36B authorizes tax credits for individuals who enroll in
an insurance plan through a Federal Exchange. Petitioners argue that a Federal
Exchange is not ‘an Exchange established by the State’ . . . . The Government
responds that . . . the phrase ‘an Exchange established by the State’ . . . should be
read to include Federal Exchanges.”).
38. Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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purely textual reading; Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion
upheld nationwide subsidies, with logic that was no less strong
but that instead relied heavily on perceived statutory purpose:
Given that the text is ambiguous, we must turn to the
broader structure . . . “because only one of the permissible
meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible
with the rest of the law.” Here, the statutory scheme
compels us to reject petitioners’ interpretation because it
would destabilize the individual insurance market in any
State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very
“death spirals” that Congress designed the Act to avoid. “We
cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated
purposes.” 39

Explaining the Roberts votes in NFIB and King is an
active parlor game. Some argue that his role as Chief Justice
made him fear that striking down “Obamacare” would draft the
Court into the nation’s most charged political controversy. 40
The aphorism that hard cases make bad law is unclear about
what makes cases “hard”; similarly ambiguous is the less
judgmental aphorism: “Great cases, like hard cases, make bad
law.” 41 But even if not all “hard” or “great” cases make bad law,
the Court essentially conceded that highly political cases yield
idiosyncratic law when Bush v. Gore famously warned against
applying its holding as precedent: “Our consideration is limited
to the present circumstances” 42—a pronouncement derided as
39. Id. at 2492–93 (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988), and New York State Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419–20 (1973), respectively).
40. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw Jr., The Paradox of the Obamacare Decision:
How Can the Federal Government have Limited Unlimited Power?, 65 FLA. L.
REV. 1993, 1997 (2013) (recounting arguments that Roberts “sought to preserve
the Court’s image as an institution governed by law rather than politics, as the
public would perceive that the outcome was contrary to his political views and
showed . . . deference to the elected branches (and to voters, who could decide the
fate of Obamacare . . . .)”); Gregory P. Magarian, Chief Justice Roberts’s
Individual Mandate: The Lawless Medicine of NFIB v. Sebelius, 108 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 15, 16 (2013) (“I share the prevalent assumption that the Chief
Justice voted to uphold the individual mandate out of a deeply held concern for
the Court’s institutional reputation.”).
41. Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual
History, 90 GEO. L.J. 113, 115 (2001) (quoting N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197, 400–01 (1904)) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
42. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
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“not how the legal system operates [because] [d]ecisions do
create precedents,” 43 or even as “hypocrisy” or “rank
partisanship.” 44 If, as some argue, Bush v. Gore reflected a
Court adjudicating based on partisanship or a perceived need
to end a controversy, then perhaps NFIB and King show the
same. Or perhaps they show the opposite: a Court wary of
upsetting the political apple cart again, as it did in Bush v.
Gore.
A competing, more accusatory observation is that Chief
Justice Roberts’s votes “for” the PPACA simply showed he was
not the conservative many thought. That diagnosis is
embedded in the many writings by commentators 45 and
litigators 46 claiming surprise at Roberts’s votes with the
majorities upholding the health care law. Roberts’s second such
43. Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore, 34 LOY.
U. L.J. 1, 17 (2002).
44. Richard A. Posner, The 2000 Presidential Election: A Statistical and
Legal Analysis, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 37–38 (2004). Posner asserts:
[The] two most conservative Justices, Scalia and Thomas[,] . . . had gone
out of their way . . . to urge a concept of adjudication that is inconsistent
with the majority opinion that they joined . . . . Scalia’s statement [was]
that when he writes a majority opinion, he limits his freedom of action:
“If the next case should have such different facts that my political or
policy preferences regarding the outcomes are quite the opposite, I will
be unable to indulge those preferences” . . . How does this square with
the statement . . . “our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances . . . ”? It does not, thus inviting charges of hypocrisy, or
worse—the charge of rank partisanship . . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., Brian G. Gilmore, Brown v. Board of Education and National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: A Comparative Analysis of Social
Change, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 621, 622–23 (2014) (“It was a surprise
decision by Justice Roberts, as the conservative jurist voted with . . . four Justices
typically associated with more liberal jurisprudence. The recognized
conservatives . . . were left to dissent . . . when Roberts, a Justice with solid
conservative credentials, voted in favor of the law.”); Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel,
Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks: SCOTUS Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v.
Sebelius, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 883, 884 (2013) (calling Roberts’ Sebelius vote a
“significant surprise”).
46. See, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald B. Stuart, Two Years Later and
Counting: The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Taxing Power Decision on the
Goals of the Affordable Care Act, 17 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 219, 261 n.350
(2014) (former Bush administration Attorney General and a business litigator
“discussing the conservative backlash and criticisms of Chief Justice Roberts in
the wake of his ‘surprise majority opinion’”); Clint Bolick, Judicial Control: Up for
Grabs, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Aug. 2012, at 14 (conservative litigator noting that
“conservatives are surprised and disappointed with . . . Roberts’s vote to uphold
Obamacare”).
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vote (Burwell) was a bit less of a surprise after his first such
vote (NFIB), but it was no less disappointing to
conservatives. 47
But Roberts’s rulings may not be a sign that he lacks
conservative values, or that he placed his role as Chief Justice
over such values. His refusal to strike down a major federal law
on textualist logic would not have been as surprising if more
attention were paid to certain of his prior statements on legal
interpretation.
Roberts famously said little of substance at his 2005
Senate confirmation hearings, 48 but it went surprisingly littlenoticed in 2005 that Roberts had said quite a bit more at his
2003 Senate confirmation hearings for his Court of Appeals
seat. Pressed about methods of interpretation as an under-theradar appellate nominee, Roberts forthcomingly elaborated an
eclectic view of interpretation deeply at odds with the laser-like
textual focus of a Scalia, Thomas, or Alito. In interpreting the
Seventh Amendment jury trial right, a “very historical
approach” is appropriate, Roberts said, consistent with the
Scalia brand of textualism infused with historical research only

47. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, Supreme Restraint: John Roberts Marks 10 Years
As Chief Justice by Taking the Long View, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 2015,
at 54, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/john_roberts_marks_10_years_
as_chief_justice_by_taking_the_long_view
(last
visited
Jul.
16,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/RC99-CXJY] (“As if scripted by a screenwriter, Roberts wrote the
majority opinion for the court in King v. Burwell, which again sided with
President Barack Obama’s administration in upholding the president’s signature
health care law. Despite Roberts’s track record as a reliable conservative on many
issues, the ACA decision reinforced doubts among many on the political right
about his commitment to conservative ideals.”); Ilya Shapiro, Introduction: Cato
Supreme Court Review, 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5 (“The sad thing about this
entire episode is that the Chief Justice . . . damaged his own reputation by making
this move after months of warnings . . . that striking down the law would be
‘conservative judicial activism’ . . . . Had the Court struck down Obamacare, it
would have ‘simply’ been a very high-profile legal ruling . . . . Instead, we have a
political or otherwise strategic decision dressed up in legal robes . . . . Roberts, in
refraining from making that hard balls-and-strikes call . . . , has shown why we
don’t want our judges playing politics.”).
48. See, e.g., Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.? Did the Roberts Hearings
Junk the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2
(2006) (noting, but partly rejecting, the prevailing view that in “[Judiciary]
Committee[] hearings on . . . Roberts’ nomination for Chief Justice[,] . . . the
coverage . . . has been predominantly negative . . . . Committee members have
been derided as timid and inept in their questioning, while [Roberts] was
criticized as evasive, avoiding any clear picture of what his approach to major
issues would be.”).
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into the original meanings of the words in the text. 49 But
Roberts then espoused other, very different interpretive views:
for the Fourth Amendment search and seizure provisions, “you
have to look beyond the text” because it is “difficult to say just
based on the text what’s unreasonable and what’s not”; 50 and
for the Eleventh Amendment, “strict adherence to the text
doesn’t give you what the Supreme Court says are the right
answers.” 51
Nothing in Roberts’s history hints that he was less
Republican or conservative than Alito. But his 2003 comments
hinted at what we saw in the health care cases a decade later:
Roberts is not the textualist Alito is; and even if they vote
together in over 90% of cases, their differences in the other
nearly 10% can matter a great deal. Thus, the Roberts-Alito
split traces to their divergent views on textualism, not to
simple ideology. As detailed below, the same divergence as to
textualism appears among federal district judges.
II. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES’ SIMILARLY VARIED VIEWS ON
TEXTUALISM: STRIKING DIFFERENCES IN USE OF
DICTIONARIES TO DECIDE THE MEANING OF TEXT
This Part documents that federal district judges display
methodological differences similar to the Roberts-Alito
divergence as to dictionary-driven textualism. While
dictionaries might seem too ubiquitous a tool of legal analysis
to vary among judges, Section II.A details, based on analysis of
a sample of judicial opinions, how district judges do vary
greatly in the frequency and depth of their reliance upon
dictionary definitions to determine the meanings of disputed
texts. Section II.B then details, based on an analysis of selected
conservative and liberal district judges, how reliance upon
49. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of John G. Roberts,
Nominee to be Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit) (“We take a very
historical approach to deciding whether you have a right to a jury trial because of
the way the Seventh Amendment is worded.”).
50. Id. (“Unreasonable searches and seizures, that’s a little more difficult to
say just based on the text I know what’s unreasonable and what’s not. You have to
look beyond the text in interpreting that.”).
51. Id. (“[W]hen you get to the Eleventh Amendment, the one thing we know
from the Supreme Court’s decision is that strict adherence to a text doesn’t give
you what the Supreme Court says are the right answers. You have to look at the
historical context a little more . . . .”).
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dictionary definitions does not appear to correlate closely with
judicial ideology—contrary to extensive conventional wisdom
that dictionary-driven textualism is a form of conservative
judging that liberal jurists predominantly reject.
A.

Similar Textualism Variation Among District Judges:
Twenty-Five Years of Data on Dictionary Reliance by
One District’s Judges

As the 93% Roberts-Alito voting overlap shows, Supreme
Court coalition-building tends to mute methodological
differences. Justices do not always dissent or concur separately
when agreeing on conclusions while disagreeing on analysis;
Roberts joined Alito’s dictionary-driven opinion in Kellogg
Brown & Root while Alito joined Roberts’s policy-driven opinion
in MacLean. But in the lower courts, when only one, two, or
three judges determine the decision, judges’ individual methods
of decision making can be far more dispositive.
Do federal district judges show differences, like that
between Roberts and Alito, in their affinity for textualist
analysis? The answer is a clear “yes.” For each federal district
judge in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado in the past twenty-five years, 52 I tallied how many
decisions cited any of the three major mass-market English
dictionaries 53 with a search for opinions by the particular judge
52. While most of the included district judges were not on the bench for all
twenty-five years from 1991 to 2015, I excluded only the two judges whose tenure
included too small a portion of the twenty-five-year period to feature enough
opinions to study: Judge Arraj had just two opinions, and Judge Carrigan had
only 106 opinions, in the early 1990s. Given that dictionary usage ranges from
roughly 0–3% for all district judges, roughly a hundred opinions or fewer seemed
too small a sample to include in the study.
53. I considered any Webster’s, Oxford, or American Heritage dictionary.
Those are the three best-selling dictionaries on Amazon, but in reality, Webster’s
has the overwhelming majority of the market share of judicial citations: in the
twenty-five years of Colorado district opinions reviewed, there were 126 citations
to Webster’s, but barely one-quarter as many (33) to the Oxford English
Dictionary and barely one-fifth as many (26) to the American Heritage Dictionary.
I did not include Black’s Law Dictionary, because it is such a different resource
from lay dictionaries; Black’s defines mainly legal terms, so courts often cite it for
specialized legal terms, not the ordinary English terms for which courts might cite
Webster’s or other mass-market dictionaries. See, e.g., McLean v. Air Methods
Corp., No. 1:12-CV-241-JGM, 2014 WL 2327045, at *2 (D. Vt. May 29, 2014)
(using Black’s for definition of “proximate cause”); Davidson v. Golden Living
Ctr.–Mountainview, No. 4:09-CV-94, 2010 WL 3155989, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 10,
2010) (using Black’s for definition of “negligence per se”).
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that cited any of those dictionaries. 54 I then tallied how many
opinions, total, each judge wrote, to allow a calculation of the
percentage of each district judge’s opinions that cited one of
those major dictionaries. This is a methodology others have
used to analyze the Supreme Court and various federal circuit
courts, 55 but not district judges—an unfortunate example of
the academic inclination to study appellate rather than district
courts. For litigators, studies of judges’ methodologies arguably
are more useful as to district rather than appellate judges.
District judges sit individually, not in panels, so a litigator who
knows the methodology of his or her district judge knows
exactly how the court’s unitary decision-maker thinks. In
contrast, an appellate litigator at most can learn the
potentially differing methodologies of varied appellate panel
members, without knowing which judge’s methodology might
prevail in a particular case.
Table 1 contains the findings on dictionary citation by
district judges in the District of Colorado from 1991 through
2015; Tables 2 and 3, in Section II.B below, contain the
findings as to selected other judges in different federal judicial
districts. The columns show the following: (1) the name of each
judge; (2) the judge’s number of opinions citing dictionaries; (3)
the judge’s total number of opinions; (4) the judge’s percentage
of opinions citing dictionaries (i.e., column 2 divided by column
3); and (5) the z-score of the difference between that judge’s
dictionary-citing rate and the average rate of all judges
examined. The z-score is a measure of how likely a judge’s
above- or below-average dictionary-citing rate is a real
54. A separate search was conducted for each judge in the Westlaw database
for federal district court decisions (“DCT”): JU( [last name of judge] ) & DA(after
12/31/1990) & DA(before 1/1/2016) & ((Webster! “American Heritage” Oxford) /6
Dictionary). I then eliminated any opinions from a different judge who might have
had the same last name.
55. E.g., John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in
Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484 (2014)
(analyzing “a comprehensive dataset covering dictionary usage in every Supreme
Court and circuit court opinion from 1950 to 2010”); Joseph Scott Miller & James
A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent
Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 832–33 (2005) (noting initially that
“[o]ver the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has increasingly relied on
dictionaries to explain its constructions of legal text,” and proceeding to detail a
study documenting “that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . .
which hears all appeals arising under the U.S. patent laws, has also turned
increasingly to dictionaries when explaining its constructions of disputed terms in
patent claims”).
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tendency or the result of random chance (e.g., perhaps the
judge randomly had more or fewer cases implicating word
definitions). A score of 2.0 or more (or under -2.0), for example,
means the judge’s dictionary-citing rate differed from the
average (here, 1.47%) greatly enough that there is only an
approximately 5% probability that difference resulted from
random chance; a score of 1.65 (or -1.65) means only a roughly
10% probability that difference traces to random chance. 56

56. These statistical significance calculations are premised on assumptions
that real-world social science data sets rarely fulfill perfectly, such as a bell-curveshaped normal distribution of the variable (here, dictionary-citing rate). That
said, the distribution of judges’ dictionary-citing rates (those in Tables 1–3
combined) does appear somewhat bell-curve-like, with a peak between roughly 1.0
and 1.6, somewhat fewer in the 0.5–1.0 and 1.6–2.2 range, and scattered points
near zero and above 3.0.
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Table 1:
Opinions by Federal District Judges in the District of Colorado
Citing Major Dictionaries, 1991–2015
Judge
Edward W.
Nottingham
John L.
Kane
Marcia S.
Krieger
Christine
Arguello
Richard
Matsch
Philip A.
Brimmer
Raymond P.
Moore
Lewis T.
Babcock
Wiley Y.
Daniel
Walker
Miller
Robert E.
Blackburn
William J.
Martinez
R. Brooke
Jackson

#
%
Dictionary- Total # DictionaryCiting
Opinions
Citing
Opinions
Opinions

Z-Score

18

495

3.64%

4.02

15

936

1.60%

0.34

25

1300

1.54%

0.22

19

1333

1.43%

-0.11

8

595

1.34%

-0.26

22

1854

1.19%

-0.99

3

303

0.99%

-0.69

20

2317

0.86%

-2.43

14

1688

0.83%

-2.18

6

763

0.79%

-1.56

11

1984

0.55%

-3.40

4

775

0.52%

-2.19

1

566

0.18%

-2.55

As with any quantitative analysis, there are caveats about
what this one might omit. It does not consider other
dictionaries, for example. But given that Webster’s is cited four
to five times as often as the other leading dictionaries, 57
considering dictionaries beyond the top several is unlikely to
57.

See supra note 53.
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make a material difference, much less help low-dictionaryusage judges catch up to those using dictionaries two to ten
times as often. The data also fails to consider that some senior
judges may have fewer criminal cases, which conceivably could
make their caseloads different. But it is not clear whether
criminal and civil cases meaningfully differ in how often they
implicate dictionary definitions—and random assignment still
predominates enough that caseload differences are unlikely to
explain why some judges cite dictionaries so much more than
others.
Despite any caveats, it is hard to ignore the simple fact:
some judges, on the Supreme Court and in this district alike,
find dictionary-based textual reasoning more persuasive than
others—a fact lawyers should (and likely do) know. Litigators
with cases before Judge Nottingham, for example, should (and
likely would) know to make textual arguments that might not
be as strategic to make (or to focus on) with judges who almost
never cite dictionaries, such as Judges Daniel, Jackson,
Martinez, or Moore.
And the anecdotes confirm the data: the ways in which the
judges cite dictionaries show how differently they view
dictionaries as persuasive textualist authority. The judges who
rarely cite dictionaries tend to cite them to respond to parties’
own dictionary-based arguments or as mere secondary
supporting authority for holdings they support mainly with
caselaw, drawing more primary support from caselaw and
other legal authorities. The one time Judge Jackson cited a
dictionary, it was because one of the parties made “reference to
a dictionary definition” as “extrinsic evidence” supporting its
patent interpretation. 58 Of Judge Martinez’s four decisions
citing dictionaries, the most detailed was the one below, which
relied primarily on prior caselaw interpreting the statute,
citing only dictionaries submitted in court filings (as shown by
their “ECF” docket citations), and only as a “see also” following
the caselaw citations:
[A]n alien who commits any offense . . . is subject to
mandatory detention “when the alien is released.” 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)(1). Mr. Beltran argues that . . . does not apply to

58. Cellport Sys., Inc. v. Peiker Acustic GmbH & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1293,
1304 (D. Colo. 2012).

8. 88.1 MOSS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

20

11/16/2016 2:54 PM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

him because immigration officials detained him several
years after he was released . . . . The Court finds that the
plain meaning of “when” . . . imposes a temporal limitation
on when mandatory detention should apply and does not
authorize . . . detain[ing] . . . any time after release . . . .
Castillo-Hernandez . . . (citing Castaneda v. Souza . . . );
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY . . . (defining “when” as “at
the time that” . . . ) (ECF No. 18-5 . . . ); THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY . . . (defining “when” as “in reference
to a definite actual occurrence or fact . . . . at the time that,
on the occasion that”) (ECF No. 18-5 . . . ). Mr. Beltran’s
detention . . . five years after his release . . . does not satisfy
the statutory directive of detention “when . . . released.” The
Court rejects Respondents’ efforts to read an ambiguity into
the statute for the reasons discussed by . . . CastilloHernandez and . . . Baquera . . . . [T]he statute requires . . .
officials to detain . . . at the time the alien is released . . . for
mandatory detention under § 1226(c) to apply. 59

The judges rarely citing dictionaries are not at all like
Justice Alito, who in Kellogg Brown & Root cited dictionaries
more often, and as more primary authority, than caselaw. 60
Paralleling Justice Alito, Judge Nottingham relied almost
entirely on legal and lay dictionaries to decide the key issue:
does water damage caused by a vandalized sprinkler qualify as
damage “caused by vandalism” that the insurer need not cover?
To Judge Nottingham, the answer depended less on contract
law or insurance law than on dictionary definitions of
“vandalism”:
Plaintiffs assert that . . . dictionary consultation is
appropriate to understand the term. . . . The court
agrees. . . . Plaintiffs cite the widely-recognized Black’s law
dictionary and Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary to
establish that “vandalism” is . . . either “willful or ignorant
destruction of public or private property” or “willful or
malicious destruction or defacement of public or private
property.” . . . Plaintiffs then turn to the [insurance] report,
59. Beltran v. Holder, No. 13-CV-03067-WJM, 2014 WL 1491250, at *4–6 (D.
Colo. Jan. 21, 2014) (citations omitted), vacated in part, 2014 WL 321369 (D. Colo.
Jan. 29, 2014).
60. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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which indicates that “the cause of the failure of the subject
sprinkler head was from deliberate tampering . . . .”
Any variance between “vandalism” and “deliberate
tampering” is . . . without a difference. “Deliberate” is
defined as “characterized by or resulting from slow, careful,
thorough calculation and consideration of effects or
consequences: not hasty, rash, or thoughtless.” WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 596. . . . “To tamper” is defined as
“to interfere so as to weaken or change for the worse.” Id. at
2336. . . . How slowly and carefully calculated interference
so as to weaken or worsen could be characterized as
anything other than purposeful destruction escapes this
court . . . . Given the facts as presented, the court finds that
Plaintiffs have failed to raise an issue of fact concerning the
applicability of the vandalism limitation. 61

In sum, judges citing dictionaries less often (e.g., Martinez
and Jackson) typically also rely on them less deeply than judges
(e.g., Nottingham and Alito) who cite dictionaries more often
and as more authoritative sources.
B.

Textualism’s Non-Correlation with Ideology: The
Court’s Mixed-Ideology Caselaw, and Data on
Conservative and Liberal District Judges

The most conservative three Justices (Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito) cite dictionaries far more than other current or prior
justices, 62 giving their “textualist interpretation” of statutes a
reputation as the “conservative perspective on statutory
interpretation.” 63 Textualism is inherently narrowing, making
61. Saiz v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., No. 06 CV 01144-EWN-BNB, 2007 WL
2701398, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2007), aff’d, 299 F. App’x 836 (10th Cir. 2008).
62. Calhoun, supra note 55, at 490 (“[T]extualist judges like Justices Scalia
and Thomas do in fact cite dictionaries in a higher percentage of their opinions
than non-textualist judges like Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.”).
63. Ramona L. Paetzold, Supreme Court’s 2005–2006 Term Employment Law
Cases: Do New Justices Imply New Directions?, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 303,
348–49 (2006). Though beyond the scope of this Article, it bears mention that
some argue that notionally “textualist” Justices implicitly rely on non-textual
values and policy arguments. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two
Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV.
25, 25–26 (1994) (so noting as to constitutional textualism, detailing how, despite
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it a conservative way for judges to read the remedial statutes
they frequently interpret, some argue: “Barring judges from
looking at the history of a statute and confining them strictly to
its text means that the statute will only apply in those
instances that Congress explicitly passes upon. The scope of
governmental regulation is thereby constricted.” 64 More bluntly
put, “textualism arguably makes it more difficult for Congress
to achieve its underlying objectives because courts have a
tendency to interpret the law in a relatively stingy fashion.”65
Or conservative judges may simply dislike the liberal slant of
the legislative history of most modern remedial statutes—a
suggested explanation for conservative judges’ “ungenerous
approach to statutes” by William Eskridge: “the debating
history of federal statutes, most of which were enacted by
Democratic Congresses[,] . . . [is] slanted . . . in a more
regulatory-state direction.” 66
But the broader Supreme Court jurisprudence, and this
Article’s district judge data, show that it is overly simplistic to
say that textualism is “conservative,” or to declare that
“[s]tatutory textualism has adherents . . . throughout the
federal judiciary, and . . . almost all of them are politically
conservative.” 67 As statutory interpretation scholar Margaret
Justices Hugo Black’s and Antonin Scalia’s “intense and persistent proclamations
of fidelity to . . . text . . . , neither Justice has avoided basing his interpretation . . .
on values not grounded in the text. Both have relied heavily on their personal and
political judgments regarding the role of the federal judiciary . . . .”). This Article
takes no side as to such arguments that valueless textualism is impossible, or at
least more rare than textualists acknowledge; whether or not that argument is
true does not affect this Article’s more empirical point that textualism, as
currently practiced, is not as uniformly conservative as commonly assumed.
64. Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory
Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37, 68 (1991).
65. Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 143, 183 n.178 (2009); see also Simon Lazarus, Stripping the Gears of
National Government: Justice Stevens’s Stand Against Judicial Subversion of
Progressive Laws and Lawmaking, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 769, 786 (2012) (“[I]n the
great majority of cases in which the challenge is to choose among plausible
alternative interpretations of nondefinitive statutory words, . . . the practical
effect of the rigidities of contemporary conservatives’ textualist doctrine is to deny
judges the most commonsense options for resolving ambiguities—thoughtful
analysis of reliable indicia of purpose and legislative history materials
generally.”).
66. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1509, 1522 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)).
67. Paul Killebrew, Where Are All the Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1895, 1895 (2007); see also Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L.

8. 88.1 MOSS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

11/16/2016 2:54 PM

JUDGES’ VARIED VIEWS ON TEXTUALISM

23

Lemos notes, “textualism is not inherently conservative in
design, nor does it reliably produce conservative results.” 68 But
while “the theory of textualism is not conservative, the broader
practice of textualism surely is”—at least on the modern Court.
Lemos details:
[C]onservatives
embraced
textualism
in
statutory
interpretation (together with originalism in constitutional
interpretation) as the antidotes to the “judicial activism” of
the Warren and Burger Courts. Textualism and originalism
were united in their appeal to judicial restraint and their
challenge to the legal status quo. Adopting the language of
methodology therefore gave . . . [a] means of critiquing
existing law and pushing for legal change . . . . [I]t became
clear that the “new textualism” was a force for moving the
69
law to the right . . . .

Because the ideological implications of textualism are
nuanced, as Lemos notes, the modern Court’s brand of
statutory textualism has generated a number of conservative
outcomes, but also more ideologically mixed outcomes than is
often acknowledged. To be sure, statutory textualism can yield
conservative decisions by construing remedial statutes strictly:
“Our inquiry . . . must focus on the text,” Justice Thomas wrote
for the majority in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 70
citing multiple dictionaries contemporaneous with relevant
statutory enactments to impose a stricter causation standard
under the age discrimination statute (the ADEA) than under
the race, gender, and religious discrimination statute (Title
REV. 347, 373 (2005) (“Some of the differences may simply boil down to politics;
today’s textualists tend to be politically conservative . . . .”); Alexander Volokh,
Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 829 (2008) (making the argument in more nuanced form:
“accepting that some judges select interpretive methods at least partly by
ideology[,] a plausible theory explaining the apparent determinacy of textualism
is that textualist judges, who are on average more conservative, have
systematically disagreed more often with agency interpretations, and have
therefore found a plain meaning in order to substitute their more conservative
understanding of the statute”).
68. Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation: Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. By Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 853 (2013).
69. Id.
70. 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009).
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VII). 71
Yet textualism has yielded outcomes in favor of civil rights
plaintiffs too: “Our precedents make clear that the starting
point for our analysis is the statutory text,” Justice Thomas
also wrote for a unanimous Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 72 imposing a less strict Title VII causation standard
because of one word in the statutory causation language:
[If] words of the statute are unambiguous, the judicial
inquiry is complete . . . . [Title VII] unambiguously states
that a plaintiff need only “demonstrat[e]” that an employer
used a forbidden consideration . . . . On its face, the statute
does not . . . require[] . . . a heightened showing through
direct evidence. 73

Justice Scalia expressly detailed a key reason that
textualism can yield broad interpretations of remedial statutes
in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.74: that
sometimes, lawyers and judges can conclude that the text goes
further than a decades-ago Congress had intended. In Oncale,
Justice Scalia used textualism to hold that Title VII bars samesex harassment, even though that holding went well beyond
the actual purposes of the 1964 Congress:
[M]ale-on-male sexual harassment . . . was assuredly not
the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it
enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils[.] [A]nd it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than . . . concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed. 75

Justice Alito’s textualism-based ruling for a plaintiff in
Kellogg Brown & Root fits easily into the above Scalia-Thomas
71. Id. at 175–76 (“‘Statutory construction must begin with the language
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’ . . . The words ‘because of’
mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’”) (citing three dictionaries, including two from
1966, a year before ADEA enactment; other citations omitted).
72. 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003).
73. Id. at 98–99 (citations omitted).
74. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
75. Id.

8. 88.1 MOSS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

11/16/2016 2:54 PM

JUDGES’ VARIED VIEWS ON TEXTUALISM

25

pro-plaintiff textualist caselaw: textualism is a tool; while it
can yield limited-to-the-words narrow readings of remedial
statutes, it can support broader-than-intended readings of
remedial statutes too.
The district judge data shows the same, but even more
strongly. Though decades of dictionary citations by Justices
Scalia and Thomas have given the practice a conservative
reputation, among the broader federal judiciary there is little,
if any, correlation between judges’ reliance upon dictionaries
and their reputations as conservatives or liberals. The District
of Colorado’s #2 dictionary user, Judge Kane, 76 is a liberal
icon, 77 and a review of famously conservative and liberal judges
outside the district shows that their dictionary usage varies
greatly.
Review of five district judges with a record or reputation as
conservatives, 78 and five with a record or reputation as
76. Judge Kane’s 1.60% dictionary-citing rate comes with a z-score of 0.34,
which indicates that his rate is not above average to a statistically significant
degree. Yet that rate is higher than that of many other judges in the district to a
statistically significant degree, as shown by comparison to the three judges
appointed by President Obama: Kane’s rate is significantly higher than those of
Judges William J. Martinez (0.52%, with a z-score of -2.19) and R. Brooke Jackson
(0.18%, with a z-score of -2.55); Kane’s rate also is higher than that of Judge
Raymond P. Moore (0.99%), just not quite to a statistically significant degree, in
large part because the recency of Moore’s appointment limits his sample size.
77. See Kirk Mitchell, Feisty Federal Judge in Denver Knows All About
Challenging Authority, DENVER POST, Aug. 3, 2014, noting:
Early in Kane’s judicial career, a Colorado prisoner sued the state
claiming that his cramped prison cell . . . violated his constitutional
rights. When Kane refused to dismiss the case and demanded that the
state abide a federal standard of holding inmates in cells that were at
least 72-square feet, it set off a maelstrom of outrage by legislators who
claimed it would bankrupt the state. Kane was not swayed . . . . His
decision withstood appeals and in more than 30 years since then has
been cited as a standard of law throughout the country. What irks the
judge more than anything is encountering leaders who abuse their
authority, he said. “People who are subject to the whims and caprice of
other people,” Kane said . . . .
78. I chose the five reputedly conservative federal district judges as follows:
Four were those who had the most high-profile conservative rulings of the past
several years (each detailed below); the fifth, Judge Mukasey, was appointed to be
United States Attorney General, making him the district judge who subsequently
held the highest-profile public office above that of a United States District Judge.
•Two were appointees of President George W. Bush who ruled against
the Obama administration in high-profile cases. Judge Rosemary M.
Collyer (D. D.C.) ruled that the House of Representatives had standing
to sue the Obama administration over appropriations for the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act. House of Representatives v. Burwell,
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liberals, 79 corroborates the lack of correlation between ideology
130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015). Judge Andrew S. Hanen (S.D. Tex.)
ruled against the Obama administration’s action to grant deferral of
deportation action and work authorization to certain undocumented
immigrants. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
•Judge Amul Roger Thapar (E.D. Ky.) drew initial attention as a
Federalist Society member nominated by President Bush at age 38, then
for issuing lengthy sentences in a high-profile case of peace protesters
who broke into a nuclear facility. Associated Press, Nun, 84, gets 3 years
in prison for breaking into nuclear weapons complex, CBS NEWS (Feb. 18,
2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nun-84-gets-3-years-in-prison-forbreaking-in-nuclear-weapons-complex/
(last visited Jan. 15, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/PBX8-HSXK] (“Judge Amul Thapar said he was
concerned they showed no remorse and he wanted the punishment to be
a deterrent for other activists.”).
•Judge Michael Mukasey (S.D.N.Y.) was appointed a district judge by
President Ronald Reagan, then appointed Attorney General by President
George W. Bush.
•Judge Rudolph Randa (E.D. Wis.), another Reagan appointee, is a
Federalist Society advisor with controversial rulings against criminal
defendants and in politically charged cases. Daniel Bice, Federal Judges
Lynn Adelman, Rudolph Randa Are Polar Opposites, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (May 10, 2014) (“Randa threw out a federal law . . . [on] access
to abortion clinics . . . [and] was reversed . . . . Randa ordered . . . [a]
state purchasing official . . . jailed while she appealed her conviction for
steering a travel contract . . . to supporters of then-Gov. Jim Doyle . . . .
The appeals court . . . call[ed] the evidence ‘beyond thin,’ order[ing]
her . . . freed immediately. . . . Randa was overturned for forcing a
prisoner to wear prison garb . . . during his civil rights case . . . . Judge
Richard Posner wrote that . . . prisoner clothing in front of a jury is
‘highly prejudicial.’”).
79. I chose the five reportedly liberal federal district judges as follows. One
(Sotomayor) was the only Democratic appointee to the United States Supreme
Court in decades to have been a United States District Judge; one (Jenkins) was
the district judge who approved the highest profile civil rights class action of
recent decades, one that subsequently led the Supreme Court to reshape class
action law by reversing his decision; the three others (Gertner, Bennett, and
Adelman) are widely known, as detailed by the below citations to their writings
and media coverage, as the most prominent and outspoken liberal district judges
in recent decades.
•Sonia Sotomayor was a district judge (S.D.N.Y.) before her promotion to
the Second Circuit and then the United States Supreme Court in 2009 by
President Barack Obama.
•Judge Nancy Gertner (D. Mass.), appointed by President Bill Clinton,
issued controversial rulings such as barring mandatory arbitration in
discrimination cases, Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998), and became all the more
outspoken after retiring. E.g., Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 109, 117 (Oct. 16, 2012) (claiming that judges are trained “to
get rid of civil rights cases”: “At the start of my judicial career . . . , the
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and dictionary reliance. Among the reputed conservatives, only
one of the five cites dictionaries at roughly Judge Nottingham’s
high 3% rate; two others are relatively high at roughly 2%, but
two others are near 1%. Among the reputed liberals, the
numbers are strikingly similar: one around 3%; two just over
2%; and two near 1.5%.

trainer teaching discrimination law to new judges announced, ‘Here’s
how to get rid of civil rights cases . . . .’”); Conor Friedersdorf, Federal
Judge: My Drug War Sentences Were Unfair and Disproportionate,
ATLANTIC, June 29, 2015 (“Gertner . . . compares the damage caused by
drug prohibition to the destruction of cities in World War II.”).
•Judge Mark W. Bennett (N.D. Ia.), also a Clinton appointee, argues
that “the time has come to bury summary judgment” because of its
“abuse and overuse by my federal judge colleagues,” especially in
discrimination cases due to docket pressure and “implicit bias in judicial
decisions.” Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No
Summary Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to
the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days:
One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 686
(2013).
•Judge Lynn Adelman (E.D. Wis.), also a Clinton appointee, issued a
later-reversed ruling striking down a politically controversial voter
identification law, as well as numerous controversial rulings reversing
criminal convictions. Daniel Bice, Federal Judges Lynn Adelman,
Rudolph Randa Are Polar Opposites, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 10,
2014) (recounting numerous such rulings by Adelman).
•Judge Martin Jenkins (N.D. Cal.), also appointed by President Clinton,
certified the Wal-Mart national gender discrimination class action that
was reversed in a 2011 Court decision disallowing such broad classes.
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 2004),
aff’d, 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
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Table 2:

Opinions by Selected Reputedly Conservative Federal Judges
Citing Major Dictionaries, 1991–2015
# Dictionary-

Total #

% Dictionary-

Citing Opinions

Opinions

Citing Opinions

6

186

3.23%

2.00

11

493

2.23%

1.41

Rosemary M.
Collyer
(D.D.C.)

24

1202

2.00%

1.54

Michael
Mukasey
(S.D.N.Y.)

17

1308

1.30%

-0.50

Rudolph
Randa
(E.D. Wis.)

14

1464

0.96%

-1.61

Judge

Andrew S.
Hanen
(S.D. Tex.)
Amul R.
Thapar
(E.D. Ky.)

Z-Score

Table 3:

Opinions by Selected Reputedly Liberal Federal Judges
Citing Major Dictionaries, 1991–2015
# Dictionary-

Total #

% Dictionary-

Citing Opinions

Opinions

Citing Opinions

64

1831

3.28%

6.45

12

520

2.31%

1.60

9

438

2.05%

1.01

Lynn
Adelman
(E.D. Wis.)

40

2394

1.67%

0.82

Martin
Jenkins
(N.D. Cal.)

10

674

1.48%

0.03

Judge

Mark W.
Bennett
(N.D. Ia.)
Nancy
Gertner
(D. Mass.)
Sonia
Sotomayor
(S.D.N.Y.)

Z-Score
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The above data show that district judges’ divergence as to
textualism does not cleanly track their ideologies. This finding
parallels the example of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, who differ greatly as to textualism, but otherwise share
great ideological similarities.
These findings are not just an intellectual analysis; they
contain a real lawyering lesson. Many district judges come to
the bench with identifiable ideological backgrounds. Lawyers
might naturally assume that the textualism that guides
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito to use dictionary definitions
identically would guide the decision making of district judges
with similar conservative reputations, and thus that a briefing
before a judge like Rudolph Randa or Michael Mukasey should
cite dictionary definitions and other textualist arguments that
those judges are likely to deem persuasive. Conversely, a
lawyer with a case before a reputedly liberal district judge like
Mark Bennett or Nancy Gertner might naturally assume that
such a judge would be unreceptive to the sort of dictionarybased textualist arguments that appeal to Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito. All of those assumptions would be wrong,
however. Judges Bennett (3.28%) and Gertner (2.31%) are
double to triple as likely to rely on dictionaries than Judges
Randa (0.96%) and Mukasey (1.30%).
“[I]f you are a litigator” deciding how to advocate a
particular interpretation, “your presumptive position in favor
of your favorite theory will . . . be slight”: because your goal is
to win your case, “[y]ou will thus almost always be willing to
deviate from your favorite theory in a case where a different
theory would work better.” 80 This Article’s findings show that
lawyers rely on erroneous stereotypes if they write briefs and
present arguments on the assumption that textualist
arguments persuade conservative judges, but not liberal
judges. This is not to disagree with the conventional wisdom
that “litigators know that the identity of the judge has a
profound effect on the odds of winning a case, and will make
extraordinary efforts to get their case before an ideologically
receptive” judge or panel. 81 Where this Article disagrees with
80. Volokh, supra note 67, at 839.
81. Karl S. Coplan, Legal Realism, Innate Morality, and the Structural Role of
the Supreme Court in the U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 86 TUL. L. REV. 181, 194
(2011).

8. 88.1 MOSS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

30

11/16/2016 2:54 PM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

the conventional wisdom is in noting that conservative does not
imply textualist, as is commonly assumed. The perfect overlap
between the three most conservative Justices and the three
most textualist Justices is a pattern that simply does not hold
in the lower courts—an important fact for lawyers to know as
they strategize which arguments might persuade their judges,
and thus which arguments might help them win their cases.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is an important enough institution
that even its driest cases offer useful hints about how judges
operate. Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean 82 and
Kellogg Brown & Root v. U.S., ex rel. Carter 83 resolved
questions of importance to narrow fields of law (federal
employee whistleblowing and False Claims Act cases,
respectively), but for this Article’s purposes, their import was
what they showed about the Justices’ methodologies: that
Justice Alito is every bit the dictionary-reliant statutory
textualist that Justices Scalia and Thomas are; but that Chief
Justice Roberts is more of a purposivist, relying on statutory
history, purposes, and structure, in addition to the text itself.
This difference sheds light on the more famous Roberts-Alito
divergence: their repeated divergence on the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, first in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 84 then in King v. Burwell.85
In both cases, to interpret a complex statutory scheme, Alito
looked only to the text (e.g., a “tax” is a “tax” if and only if
labeled as such), while Roberts looked to the policy intent of
Congress—a clear difference in methodology that parallels
Alito’s textualism-only analysis in Kellogg Brown & Root and
Roberts’s pragmatic purposivism in MacLean.
But the Roberts-Alito divergence is just an example of a
broader judicial phenomenon: that ideologically similar judges
can vary widely in their adherence to textualism. Textualism
has earned a conservative reputation, but mainly from the
specific historical context of three particular Justices joining
the Court in an era when some conservatives saw strict textual
82.
83.
84.
85.

135 S. Ct. 913 (2015).
135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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interpretations as a way to rein in the excesses of prior rulings.
A broader look at the Court’s jurisprudence confirms that
textualism can yield ideologically mixed results, including
surprising rulings for plaintiffs suing under remedial statutes.
The District Court data and findings in this Article
corroborate the above interpretation: that textualism need not
be a conservative tool; and that judicial ideology does not
clearly predict the use or rejection of textualist analysis.
Analysis of all District of Colorado judges shows an imperfect
at best correlation between judicial ideology and textualism,
and a broader national analysis of five reputedly conservative
district judges and five reputedly liberal district judges shows
no pattern whatsoever: the most frequent dictionary-citers
include some of the judges identified as most conservative and
some identified as most liberal; and the most infrequent
dictionary-citers include a similar conservative-liberal mix of
judges. Lawyers should know this: it is too simplistic to assume
that a reportedly conservative judge will adhere to Scaliabrand textualism while a reportedly liberal judge will not;
judges are individuals, and while they can display patterns in
their methodologies, a textualism-ideology pattern is not one of
them.

